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Abstract
In vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), some distinct characteristics, such as high node mobility, introduce new
non-trivial challenges to quality-of-service (QoS) provisioning. Although some excellent works have been done on
QoS issues in VANETs, security issues are largely ignored in these works. However, it is know that security always
comes at a price in terms of QoS performance degradation. In this article, we consider security and QoS issues jointly
for VANETs with cooperative communications. We take an integrated approach of optimizing both security and QoS
parameters, and study the tradeoﬀs between them in VANETs. Speciﬁcally, we use recent advances in cooperative
communication to enhance the QoS performance of VANETs. In addition, we present a prevention-based security
technique that provides both hop-by-hop and end-to-end authentication and integrity protection. We derive the
closed-form eﬀective secure throughput considering both security and QoS provisioning in VANETs with cooperative
communications. The system is formulated as a partially observable Markov decision process. Simulation results are
presented to show that security schemes have signiﬁcant impacts on the throughput QoS of VANETs, and our
proposed scheme can substantially improve the eﬀective secure throughput of VANETs with cooperative
communications.
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1 Introduction
Recently, there is a strong interest in vehicular ad hoc net-
works (VANETs), where vehicles can dynamically estab-
lish an ad hoc network without necessarily using a ﬁxed
infrastructure. VANETs can oﬀer various applications and
tremendous beneﬁts to Intelligent Transportation Sys-
tems [1]. For example, safety information exchange using
VANETs enables life-critical applications, such as the
alerting functionality during intersection traversing and
lane merging. Value-added services using VANETs can
enhance drivers’ traveling experience by providing con-
venient Internet access, navigation, toll payment services,
etc. [2].
Certainly, quality-of-service (QoS) issues in traditional
mobile ad hoc networks in general are still of interest
in VANETs. However, some distinct characteristics of
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VANETs, such as high node mobility, introduce new non-
trivial challenges to QoS provisioning in VANETs [3,4].
Particularly, in vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications,
due to high vehicle mobility and relatively low elevation of
the antennas on the communicating vehicles, other vehi-
cles will act as obstacles to the signal, often aﬀecting prop-
agation even more than static obstacles (e.g., buildings or
hills), especially in the case of an open road [5]. Indeed,
non-line-of-sight safety-critical conditions require care-
ful attention in order to provide safety beneﬁts in
VANETs [6].
There are some studies on QoS issues in VANETs.
Rawat et al. [7] propose a scheme to adapt transmission
power at the physical layer and contention window size
at the medium access control (MAC) layer based on the
estimated local vehicle density to enhance VANET per-
formance. Rate control, MAC, and routing problems in
cooperative VANETs are studied in [8], where a cross-
layer solution is developed. In [9], a contextual cooperative
congestion control policy is proposed to exploit the traﬃc
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context information of each vehicle to reduce the channel
load, while satisfying the vehicular applications require-
ments. Cross-layer routing is studied in [10] by applying
cooperative transmission and a new strategy of path selec-
tion to achieve a better tradeoﬀ between the transmission
power consumption and end-to-end reliability.
While some excellent studies have been done on QoS
issues in VANETs, security issues are largely ignored in
these works. This is not surprising, as these two important
areas have traditionally been addressed separately in the
literature. However, security is one of the main challenges
for VANETs [11], and it is known that security always
comes with a price in terms of QoS performance degrada-
tion, since securing communications against the adversary
typically consumes network resources in terms of band-
width and/or hardware capacities [12]. This price may
be tolerable in wireline networks, but it may dominate
the consumption of scarce network resources in VANETs.
This situation makes the study of tradeoﬀs between QoS
and security in VANETs an important open challenge [13].
In this article, we consider security and QoS issues
jointly for VANETs with cooperative communications.We
take an integrated approach of optimizing both security
and QoS parameters, and study the tradeoﬀs between
them in VANETs. To the best of the authors’ knowl-
edge, combining security andQoS issues for VANETs with
cooperative communications has not been considered in
existing works. Some distinct features of this study are as
follows.
• We use recent advances in cooperative
communication to enhance the QoS performance of
VANETs. Cooperative communication in wireless
networks takes advantage of the broadcast nature of
the wireless medium to have nodes adjacent to the
source transmit the message to the destination. As a
result, nodes in the network act not only as end users
but also as relays for others to create a spatial
diversity that allows for increased throughput and
reliability [14,15]. Cooperative communication has
been considered as a promising technique, and has
been involved in the standards of WiMAX [16] and
3GPP-LTE [17].
• Prevention-based techniques, such as authentication,
are crucial as the front line of defence for the
integrity, conﬁdentiality, and non-repudiation of
communications [18]. In this article, we propose a
prevention-based security scheme for VANETs with
cooperative communications. Speciﬁcally, we make
use of an authentication protocol referred as adaptive
and lightweight protocol for both hop-by-hop and
end-to-end authentications (ALPHA) [19], which is
based on hash chains and Merkle trees (MT), i.e., a
tree of hashes [20].
• Based on the proposed prevention-based security
scheme for VANETs with cooperative
communications, we study the relay selection
problem in VANETs. In previous works on relay
selection (e.g., [14]), it is generally assumed that the
channel conditions are perfectly known and remain
in the same state from the current frame to the next.
However, these assumptions may not be realistic in
VANETs due to high node mobility. Therefore, in
this article, we consider channel estimation errors
and Markov channel models to improve the
performance in VANETs.
• We formulate the system as a partially observable
Markov decision process (POMDP) [21], which has
successfully been used to solve the security
scheduling problem [18] among others. The obtained
policy for security and QoS parameters has an
indexability property that dramatically reduces the
computation and implementation complexity.
Eﬀective secure throughput is considered as the
optimization objective in our formulation.
• Simulation results are presented to show that security
schemes have signiﬁcant impacts on the throughput
QoS of VANETs, and our proposed scheme can
substantially improve the eﬀective secure throughput
of VANETs with cooperative communications.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows.
Section 2 presents the systemmodel.We derive the secure
throughput in Section 3. Stochastic formulation of the
joint design of security and QoS provisioning is presented
in Section 4. Simulation results are presented and dis-
cussed in Section 5. Finally, we conclude this study in
Section 6 with future work.
2 Systemmodel
In this section, we ﬁrst describe a simple vehicle ad hoc
network model. Then, theMarkov channel model is intro-
duced next. Finally, we describe the authentication model.
2.1 Network model
We consider a simple VANET with cooperative com-
munications, where each vehicle has the ability to relay
data packets to each other. When viewed from the multi-
hop routing diversity point of view, the ﬁrst hop is more
important than all subsequent hop(s) [22]. Therefore, in
this study, we only consider two-hop relays, compris-
ing of a source (S), destination (D), and K relay nodes,
R1,R2, . . . ,Rk , . . . ,RK , as shown in Figure 1. The source
node can send information to the destination directly
or through a relay. As the relay cannot transmit and
receive simultaneously, on account of the half-duplex con-
straint, the transmission time is divided into two time
slots with transmission by the source in the ﬁrst time slot,
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Figure 1 A simple vehicle ad hoc network with cooperative communications.
transmission by the relay in the second time slot, and the
destination ﬁnally combining the two received signals.
In our network model, all vehicles are considered to be
transmitting with the same average transmit signal power.
We denote the average transmitted signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) between any nodes as γ , which is given by
γ = PwN0W , (1)
where Pw is the average transmit signal power, W is the
transmission bandwidth, and N0 is the noise.
We denote the channel gain between two nodes, x and
y, as hxy. Therefore, the channel gain between the source
vehicle and the destination vehicle is denoted as hSD. The
channel gain between the source vehicle and a relay vehi-
cle Rk is denoted as hSRk , and the channel gain between
a relay vehicle and the destination vehicle is denoted
as hRkD. We further denote the average received SNR
between the source vehicle and the destination vehicle as
γSD, the average received SNR between the source and the
relay as γSRk , and the average received SNR between the
relay vehicle and the destination vehicle as γRkD. Accord-
ingly, we can get γSD= γhSD , γSRk =
γ
hSRk
, and γRkD= γhRkD .
In this article, since our main focus is on the joint design
of security and QoS issues, we assume that the problem of
ﬁghting for channel access among multiple nodes is han-
dled by MAC layer, which will be responsible for resource
sharing and contention resolution among multiple nodes.
There are many articles studying MAC issues in cooper-
ative communications in the literature (e.g., [4,23]). The
proposed design in this article can be used with these
MAC schemes.
2.2 Channel model
In this article, we use ﬁnite-sate Markov channel (FSMC)
models. FSMC models have widely been accepted in the
literature as an eﬀective approach to characterize the
correlation structure of wireless channels. These include
the following channels: satellite channels [24], indoor
channels [25], Rayleigh fading channels [26], Ricean fad-
ing channels [27], and Nakagami fading channels [28].
Considering FSMC models can enable substantial perfor-
mance improvement over the schemes with memoryless
channel models [29,30].
In the FSMC, the range of the channel gain is partitioned
(quantized) into L levels, and each level is associated with
a state of a Markov chain. The channel varies over these
states at each time slot according to a set of Markov
transition probabilities. In VANETs, the diﬀerent chan-
nel gains between source and relay (S2R) hSRk , relay and
destination (R2D) hRkD, as well as source and destination
(S2D) hSD can be modeled as a random variable accord-
ing to an FSMC, which is characterized by a set of states
 = γ0, γ1, . . . , γL−1. Due to high node mobility and
channel estimation errors, the channel states may not be
perfectly known.
Let ψk(i, j)) denote the probability that hSRk moves from
state i to state j, where i, j ∈ {γ0, γ1, . . . , γL−1}. The L × L
channel state transition probability matrix of relay k for
source to relay channel is deﬁned as
k =[φk(i, j)]L×L . (2)
Similarly, we can get the channel state transition proba-
bility matrix of relay k for relay to destination channel as
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k =[ψk(i, j)]L×L, and the channel state transition prob-
ability matrix for source to destination channel as k =
[ ξk(i, j)]L×L.
2.3 Authentication model
There are several ways to perform authentication in com-
munication networks. Traditional public key infrastruc-
ture (PKI) approaches are gaining popularity in wireless
networks. PKI scheme uses a public key validated by a
trusted third party to encrypt a message that can only
be decrypted by the corresponding private key. In gen-
eral, PKI-based authentication mechanisms are relatively
expensive in terms of generating and verifying digital
signatures. Symmetric cryptography, where the commu-
nicating nodes share a secret, is more eﬃcient due to its
reduced computational complexity. However, when used
in cooperative communication networks, distributing the
shared keys in the ﬁrst place becomes a problem.
Hash chains are a simple and computationally eﬃcient
means of authenticating nodes in a network when tied to
identities. A hash chain is generated by hashing a random
seed variable ϑ using any cryptographic hash function.
The resulting value serves as the input for the next hash-
ing, and continues on until the desired length i is reached.
A hash chain of length i is generated as
[ϑ ,Ha(ϑ) = ha1,Ha(ha1) = Ha(Ha(ϑ)) = ha2,Ha(ha2)
= Ha(Ha(Ha(ϑ))) = ha3, . . . , hai−1, hai] ,
(3)
where hai is the anchor of the hash chain corresponding
to the last hashed value for that hash chain.
Although hash chains are uncomplicated to calculate
and easy to use, they are not suﬃcient to prevent insider
attacks by relay nodes. However, the ALPHA can prevent
insider attacks through integrity protection and also per-
form authentication making use of MT and interaction-
based hash chains, which is based on delayed message
disclosure [19]. When hash chains are combined in an
MT in ALPHA [19], they allow for the authentication
of identities while the MT provides integrity protection
for individual messages, which is especially useful for on-
path veriﬁcation with the high-volume data in cooperative
communication networks. We now begin to describe how
the ALPHA-MT scheme works in VANETs with coopera-
tive communications.
An MT is a binary tree of hashes with the leaves as
hashes of data blocks and nodes as the hashes of the con-
catenation of their respective children. In addition to the
root of the MT and the data block mj, a veriﬁer requires
a set of complementary branches {Bc}, which increases
logarithmical as the number of data blocks signed, to
authenticate each data block independently. As shown in
Figure 2, the source and destination maintain their own
separate hash chains and initially exchange their respec-
tive hash chain anchors (hSi and hDi, respectively) through
an initial handshaking process. In the case of communi-
cation passing through a relay, the anchor information is
also passed on to the relay. There are four packet types
exchanged between the source and the destination, with
the source transmitting S1 packet containing the pre-
signature and S2 packets containing the actual messages,
and the destination transmitting A1 packet containing the
pre-signature and A2 packets containing the acknowledg-
ments. The source constructs the MT with hashes of data
blocks,mj, and sends the pre-signature, which is obtained
by hashing the root with the next element of the hash
chain (i.e., key of the pre-signature), in an initial S1 packet
along with a fresh element of the hash chain. The des-
tination builds an acknowledgment MT and sends the
acknowledgment A1 packet with its own pre-signature.
The actual message transfer process is then initiated with
the source sending S2 packets corresponding to the num-
ber of messages/data blocks in the MT along with the
respective set {Bc} and key of the pre-signature. Follow-
ing receipt of this information, the destination can rebuild
theMT corresponding to the message block and verify the
integrity of the pre-signature, fromwhichwe can conclude
that the message block has not been tampered with. As a
consequence, the destination sends a positive or negative
acknowledgment (ack/nack) through the A2 packets. The
authenticity of the source or the destination can be con-
ﬁrmed by the recipient nodes by hashing the key of the
pre-signature received in the S2 or A2 packets to arrive at
the respective hash chain anchor values.
3 Secure throughput in VANETs with cooperative
communications
As we mentioned in Section 1, security always comes
with a price in terms of QoS performance degradation.
Throughput is one of the main QoS measures in VANETs.
In this section, we derive the eﬀective secure throughput
in VANETs with cooperative communications, which will
be used as the objective function in our optimization for-
mulation in Section 4. We ﬁrst derive the outage capacity.
Then, bit error rate is derived. Finally, we obtain eﬀective
secure throughput considering both the authentication
protocol and cooperative communications.
3.1 Outage capacity
The mutual information equations for non-cooperative
and cooperative diversity schemes can be described as
follows. In the non-cooperative mode, the source node
transmits the signal directly to the destination node. The
mutual information between the source and the destina-
tion in the non-cooperative mode is simply
Inon-coop = log2
(
1+ | hSD |2 γ
)
, (4)
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Figure 2Message sequence charts in VANETs.
where | hSD | is the channel between the source and
the destination. To be sustainable, the data rate over this
channel r should be less than the mutual information
Inon-coop.
In the cooperative decode-and-forward (DF) relaying
mode, the transmission between the source and the des-
tination makes use of the intermediate relay node. As
stated, the relays operate in half duplex and cannot receive
and transmit simultaneously. The relay thatmaximizes the
mutual information between the source and destination is
selected as the best relay. As indicated earlier, the trans-
mission is divided into two time slots. In the ﬁrst time
slot, the source transmits the signal to both the selected
relay and the destination. In the second time slot, the
selected relay decodes the received signal, re-encodes it,
and forwards it to the destination node. The destination
combines the received signal from the relay and source
nodes using maximal ratio combining (MRC).
The mutual information between the source and each of





1+ | hSRk |2 γ
)
. (5)
Given the half-duplex constraint, the factor 12 reﬂects the
two time slots for relaying.
The mutual information between source–destination
and destination- each of the kth relay nodes is given by
IMRC = 12 log2
(
1 + (| hSRk |2 + | hSRk |2) γ ) . (6)
Thus, the maximum end-to-end mutual information in
the cooperative DF mode is given by
Icoop = max
k∈K
min{ISRk , IMRC}. (7)
In the DF opportunistic relay, the relay is selected from
the entire set of available relays. The relay transmits only if
both source–relay and relay–destination mutual informa-
tion are above the required rate r. Thus, the source selects
the relay that maximizes the minimum mutual informa-
tion between the source–relay and the relay–destination
channels.
We consider a smart cooperative (SC) system that uses
cooperation only if it is beneﬁcial in terms of mutual infor-
mation. In this scheme, the source uses the relay only if
it increases the achievable rate. We deﬁne the deciding
criteria of the SC relaying system as the maximum end-
to-end mutual information between the cooperative and
non-cooperative mutual information, and is expressed as
ISC = max{Icoop, Inon-coop}. (8)
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When themutual information between the source, relay,
and the destination fall below the data rate (r), it indi-
cates an unsuccessful data transmission causing an out-
age. Therefore, outage probability (Pout) is deﬁned as the
probability that the mutual information (I) between the
source and the destination, including relay falls below
the required rate r, i.e.,
Pout = P[ I < r] . (9)
This indicates that the channel cannot support the
transmission rate and consequently the data transmis-
sion is unsuccessful. It is an important analytical metric
that characterizes the probability of data loss providing a
bound on the symbol error rate or equivalently of deep
fading.
In the case of the SC relaying system, the outage proba-
bility is expressed as








min{ISRk ,IMRC} < r
}
, (11)
from which we arrive at [13],






















ω = exp (2 ln υ − (lnυ)2γ ) . (14)
We consider the outage capacity CSC,kε as the largest rate
of transmission (r) that can be supported if the outages are
allowed to occur at a certain outage probability ε, which
corresponds to the probability that the transmission can-
not be decoded with negligible error probability. Solving
PSC,kout = ε, yields υε . Then, we obtain the outage capacity
as
CSC,k = r = log2
(





3.2 Bit error rate
According to [31], the end-to-end BER of SC transmission,
PSC,ke , is given by




· Pdiv,ke , (16)
where PSRkout is the outage probability of the link from
source to relay.
If an outage occurs between source and relay, the relay
will not decode, and falls back to direct transmission, i.e.,







PSDe is the probability of error in direct transmission from











and Pdiv,ke is the probability that an error occurs in com-
bined transmission from source and relay nodes at the
destination. This occurs if the relay has decided to DF the
signal to the destination. To prevent error propagation, we
assume that the relay decodes if it has correctly received
the signal from the source. When Rayleigh channel is
















In this section, we discuss the throughput performance
of the authentication protocol by considering the outage
capacity and BER of the direct communication (DC, com-
munication without the use of relay) and source–relay–
destination communication paths. The error rate is also
taken into consideration by applying ARQ retransmission
schemes, which involves error detection and retransmis-
sion of lost or corrupted packets.
The payload for ALPHA-MT scheme is given as
Spayload = n · (Spacket − Sh(log2(n) + 1)), (20)
where Spayload is the amount of payload that can be trans-
mitted with a single pre-signature, n is the number of
messages/data blocks in the MT, Spacket is the size of the
packet, and Sh is the hash output.
In general, throughput is deﬁned as the payload size
divided by the total time taken to process the payload.
In our case, while the payload is evident from the above,
the time element is dependent upon time taken for the
exchange of S1 and A1 packets, as well as S2 and A2




T1 + T2 , (21)
where T1 is the time for the initial pre-signature process
between the source and the destination. It works like a
basic Stop-and-Wait ARQ model (explained below) with
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transmission of S1 packet by the source, processing at the
destination, transmission of acknowledgment A1 packet
by the destination and processing at the source. The mes-
sage delivery is complete only after the source receives
the conﬁrmatory acknowledgment from the destination;
T2 is the time taken for the actual message transmis-
sion and delivery, i.e., the actual transfer of messages
from the source through the S2 packets and the trans-
fer of acknowledgments from the destination through A2
packets.
Both T1 and T2 are dependent on the data transmission
rate, which is equal to the outrage capacity described in
Section 3.1.
Equation (21) shows the generic throughput for the
authentication protocol. To improve system reliability, an
ARQ scheme is needed. As selective-repeat SR-ARQ has
been proven to outperform other forms of basic ARQ
schemes (stop-and-wait ARQ, go-back-N ARQ) [32], we
use SR-ARQ in this study.
Detailed studies of ARQ schemes are beyond the scope
of this article. The throughput of ARQ scheme is deﬁned
as average rate of successfully message delivery over a
communication channel. We have already explained PSC,ke
in (16) as the end-to-end BER, i.e., the probability that any
given bit of received data is in error. We deﬁne Pc as the
probability that the received packet comprising of Spacket





The throughput equation for the authentication process
needs to be modiﬁed if selective repeat SR-ARQ is used,
as only the error frames are retransmitted. The modiﬁed
throughput for the authentication process with SR-ARQ is
ThrSR = Spayload
(T1 + T2) (Pc) . (23)
For each packet size Spacket, the optimal value of the
number of messages (n) in the MT, which corresponds
to the number of S2 packets, is the value that results in
the highest throughput, which is denoted by n∗. There is
a trade-oﬀ as the throughput increases initially with the
number of messages in the MT but then starts to decrease
as a consequence of the larger signature size overheads
from the increased number of messages in theMT. There-
fore, one of the objectives in our research is to ﬁnd the
optimal number of messages in the MT for relay Rk .
4 Stochastic formulation of the joint design of
security and QoS provisioning
In this section, we formulate the eﬀective secure through-
put optimization problem in the system described above
as a POMDP [21], which can determine the optimal pol-
icy for the number of messages/data blocks in the MT
selection (for security) and relay selection (for QoS) to
maximize the system eﬀective secure throughput.
Markov decision process (MDP) provides a mathemati-
cal framework for modeling decision making in situations
where outcomes are partly random and partly under the
control of a decision maker. In VANETs with cooperative
communications, the vehicles make decisions at speciﬁc
time instances according to the current state s(t), and the
system moves into a new state based on the current state
s(t) as well as the chosen decision a(t).
As described in Section 2, we use FSMC. Given the
current channel state s(t), the next channel state is con-
ditionally independent of all previous states and actions.
This Markov property of state transition process makes it
possible to model the optimization problem as an MDP.
Furthermore, in VANETs, due to channel sensing and
channel state information errors, the system state cannot
directly be observed. As a result, we formulate the opti-
mization problem as a POMDP, in which it is assumed
that the system dynamics are determined by an MDP, but
the underlying state can only be observed inaccurately, or
with some probabilities.
A POMDP can be deﬁned by a hex-tuple
< S,A,P,,B,R >, where S stands for a ﬁnite set of
states with state i denoted by si, A stands for a ﬁnite set of
actions with action i denoted by ai, P stands for transition
probabilities for each action in each state, and paij denotes
the probability that system moves from state si to state sj
when action a is performed,  stands for a ﬁnite set of
observations, and θi denotes the observation of state i, B
is the observation model, and bajθ denotes the probability
that θ was observed when the system state is sj and last
action taken is a, and R stands for the immediate reward.
raij denotes the immediate reward received for performing
action a and the system state moves from si to state sj,
with an observation θ .
In our POMDP model, the vehicle node has to make a
decision whenever a slot has elapsed. These instant times
are called decision epochs. The optimal optimization pol-
icy can be obtained from value iteration algorithms in this
formulation. Using the POMDP-derived policy, a chan-
nel state is observed according to the information from
last slot. Based on the observation, the system jointly con-
siders the number of messages/data blocks selection and
relay selection to maximize the system throughput.
In order to obtain the optimal solution, it is necessary
to identify the states, actions, state transition probability,
observation model, and reward functions in our POMDP
model, which is described in the following sections.
4.1 Actions, states, and observations
In VANETs with cooperative communications, the vehi-
cle nodes need to decide the number of messages/data
blocks in the MT and which relay to use at every decision
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epoch. Therefore, the current composite action a(t) ∈ A
is denoted as,
a(t) = {an(t), aR(t)}, (24)
where an(t) is the action to decide the number of mes-
sages/data blocks in the MT, and an(t) > 0. aR(t) is the
relay selection action, and aR(t) ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}, where K
is the number of relays.
The current composite state s(t) ∈ S is given as
s(t) = {hSRk (t), hRkD(t), hSD(t)} , k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K},
(25)
where hSRk is the channel gain between source and relay
Rk , hRkD is the channel gain between relay Rk and desti-
nation, and hSD is the channel gain between source and
destination.
The composite observation θ(t) ∈  is deﬁned as
θ(t) =
{
ĥSRk (t), ĥRkD(t), ĥSD(t)
}
, (26)
where ĥSRk (t), ĥRkD(t), and ĥSD(t) are the observation of
hSRk , hRkD, and hSD, respectively, and they have the same
space as the state space.
4.2 State transition model and observation model
Given the current state
s(t) = {hSRk (t), hRkD(t), hSD(t)} , k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K},
(27)
the current observation θ(t) = {ĥSRk (t), ĥRkD(t), ĥSD(t)},
and the chosen action a(t), the probability function of the
next state s(t+1) = {hSRk (t+1), hRkD(t+1), hSD(t+1)}, k ∈
{1, 2, . . . ,K} is given by






hSRk (t), hSRk (t + 1)
)
ψ
× (hRkD(t), hRkD(t + 1)) ξ(hSD(t), hSD(t + 1)),
(28)
where φ(hSRk (t), hSRk (t + 1)), ψ(hRkD(t), hRkD(t + 1)),
ξ(hSD(t), hSD(t+1)) are the channel state transition proba-
bilities for diﬀerence channels as described in Section 2.2.
Given the channel estimation errors, the vehicle nodes
are not able to have full knowledge of the channel infor-
mation. Following the work in [33], we assume that the
channel estimation error has a Gaussian distribution with
zero mean and δ2 variance. At a particular time epoch, the
observed channel gain is
̂ = m + ω, (29)
where ̂ is the actual channel gain, andω is a Gaussian ran-
dom variable with zeromean and δ2 variance. The receiver
then quantizes the channel gain to the nearest possible









































, if n = 1,
0, if n = L.
(30)
In our observation model, channel observation is inde-
pendent on the composite action a(t), so we can get the
observation matrix under action a(t) as
Ba(t) =BSR1 ⊗ BSR2 . . . ⊗ BSRK ⊗ BR1D ⊗ BR2D . . .
⊗ BRKD ⊗ BSD,
(31)
where BSRk , BRkD, and BSD are channel observation
probability matrices for S2R channel, R2D channel, and
S2D channel, respectively. ⊗ denotes Kronecker product
which is used here to expand the transition matrices. Note
that all the channel observation probability is indepen-
dent. That is why we can use ⊗ to expand it.
4.3 Information state
Information state is an important concept in POMDP. We
refer to a probability distribution over states as the infor-
mation state and the entire probability space (the set of
all possible probability distributions) as the information
space. Let π t+1 = {π t0,π t1 . . . ,π tS} denote the information
space, where π ti represents the probability that the current
state is i at time t. As will be shown later, the knowledge of
the system dynamics and the transition probabilities must
be known in order to maintain an information state.
One important property of the information state is that
it can be easily updated with Bayes Rule by incorporating










where paij is the probability when the system state changes
from i to j when action a is adopted. bajθ stands for the
observation probability that we observe the system state
j to θ when action a is adopted. Both paij and bajθ are
described in Section 4.2.
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The new information state will be a vector of proba-
bilities computed according to the above formula. The
information states capture all the history information at
time t. Therefore, we can save all the past actions and
observations by constantly updating the information state.
Also, it is reasonable to make decisions according to the
information state.
4.4 Reward function and objective
Our optimization objective is to maximize the network
throughput in VANETs. Therefore, a natural deﬁnition
of the reward is the throughput that can be obtained
at each decision epoch. Given the current state s(t) =
{hSRk (t), hRkD(t), hSD(t)}, and action a(t) = {an(t), aR(t)},
the immediate reward can be deﬁned as
R(s(t), a(t)) = ThrSR(hSRk (t), hRkD(t), hSD(t), an(t), aR(t)),
(33)
where ThrSR is the throughput for the authentication
process with SR-ARQ, and it is derived in Section 3.3.
Although we use eﬀective secure throughput as the
optimization objective in our formulation, other QoS
parameter can be used in the reward function as
well. For example, when we obtain communication
delay DeSR(hSRk (t), hRkD(t), hSD(t), an(t), aR(t)) between
the source and destination node, the reward function can
be rewritten as
R(s(t),a(t))
=β ∗ ThrSR(hSRk (t), hRkD(t), hSD(t), an(t), aR(t))
+ (1 − β) ∗ DeSR(hSRk (t), hRkD(t), hSD(t), an(t), aR(t)),
(34)
where β and (1 − β) are importance weight factors to
indicate the importance of throughput and communica-
tion delay. In (34), we combine throughput and delay into
a single function. This is a common approach used in the
optimization literature, which is called Aggregate Objec-
tive Function, to solve an optimization problem with mul-
tiple objectives [34,35]. In reality, diﬀerent VANETs have
diﬀerent throughput and packet delay requirements. By
adjusting the parameters in (34), the proposed scheme is
generic enough to accommodate diﬀerent requirements in
practical VANETs.
The expected total reward of the POMDP depicts the







where μh speciﬁes the number of messages/data blocks
selection policy, μR is the relay selection policy, Eμn,μR
is the expectation when the policies μh and μR are
employed, and t0 is the initial time.
We aim to develop a joint design of an optimal policy for
throughput improvement in VANETs. {μ∗n,μ∗R} should be
a joint policy that maximizes the expected total reward in
Z decision epochs, which is






4.5 Separation principle for optimal policy
In this section, we solve the POMDP model to obtain
the optimal policy for the number of messages/data
blocks selection and relay selection. Speciﬁcally, we estab-
lish a separation principle that simpliﬁes the calculation
process.
In POMDP models, the underlying states cannot be
observed directly, the continuous information state, i.e.,
the likelihood of being in each state is used instead to
make decision. Our task is to compute a policy that
obtains, based on the information state, the maximum
expected reward for a single action. The POMDP policy
can be derived from a value function which is deﬁned over
the entire information space. LetVt(π t) be the value func-
tion that represents the maximum expected total reward
that can be obtained starting from epoch t, given infor-
mation state π t at the beginning of epoch t. The value
function of POMDP consists of the immediate reward and
the maximum expected future reward, which is given as
















where πt+1 represents the updated knowledge of system
state after incorporating the action a(t) and the observa-
tion θ(t) in the epoch t.
Smallwood and Sondik [36] have showed that the value
function with ﬁnite horizon is piecewise, linear, and con-
vex, which means that the value function can be repre-







for some sets of vectors αki (t) =
{
α0i (t),α1i (t), . . .
}
. The
sets of α-vectors represents the coeﬃcients of one of the
linear pieces of a piecewise linear function. These piece-
wise linear functions can represent the value functions for
each step in the ﬁnite horizon POMDP problem. We only
need to ﬁnd the vector that has the highest dot product
with the information state to determine which action to
take.
One of the main problem in our POMDP model
is the action space. As shown in Section 4.1, the
number of messages/data blocks selection action space
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is {an(t) : an(t) > 0}. The inﬁniteness of the action space
makes it hard to solve the model with traditional value
iteration algorithms. To this point, we establish a separa-
tion principle that leads to closed-form optimal design of
the number of messages/data blocks selection and relay
selection strategy. The policy calculation is carried out in
two steps without losing optimality.
Step 1: Calculate the optimal number of messages/data
blocks policyμn in theMT tomaximize the instantaneous
throughput subject to the current relay. Speciﬁcally, the




ThrSR(Rk , n). (39)
Step 2: Using the optimal number of messages/data
blocks policyμn given by (39), we calculate the relay selec-
tion policy to maximize the expected total throughput
with piecewise linear value functions described above.
Speciﬁcally, the optimal relay selection policy is given by






5 Simulation results and discussions
In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed
scheme, we have carried out a set of simulation exper-
iments using NS-2 simulator. We ﬁrst illustrate our
secure throughput model performance. The performance
improvement of our POMDP optimization algorithm is
given next.We then discuss the eﬀects of the channel state
transition matrix and observation model parameters on
the optimal policy.
All simulations were run on a computer equipped with
Windows 7, Intel Core 2 Duo P8400 CPU (2.26GHz) and
4GBmemory.We considered a topology set-up with three
relays located arbitrarily between the source and the des-
tination. All the initial locations of nodes are random
assigned into the VANET. When the simulation begins,
nodes start to move along with their trajectory, which are
already deﬁned. The vehicles velocity is a random num-
ber. After considering the traﬃc situation in VANET and
driver’s behavior, we set the range of velocity from 0 to
60 km/h. We assume that the state of the S2R, R2D, and
S2D channels can be bad (s0), modest (s1), or good (s2).
The corresponding SNRs to these three states for the S2D
channel are 15, 20, and 25 dB, and the corresponding
SNRs to these three states for the S2R and R2D chan-
nels are 12, 16, and 21 dB, respectively. For simplicity, we
assume the S2R channel, R2D channel, and S2D channel
have the same channel state transition probability matrix.
We set the channel transition probability of staying in the
same state as 0.6 and set the probability of transition to
the adjacent state to be three times that of transition to a
nonadjacent state. Therefore, the channel state transition
probability matrix is
Pt =



































Figure 3 Eﬀects of number of messages (n) on system secure throughput.
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Figure 4 Throughput comparison of diﬀerent policies under diﬀerent Spacket.
We took the processing time at each node as 10 μs, hash
size as 20 bytes, and a ﬁxed outage probability of 0.01. In
all ﬁgures, the values represent the average results of 20
diﬀerent runs.
5.1 Throughput improvement
We ﬁrst carry out a study to verify the secure through-
put model when authentication is used in VANETs with
cooperative communications. We consider four diﬀerent
packet sizes (Spacket) of 128, 256, 512, and 1024 bytes. The
number of messages in the MT varies by power of 2 as
theMT requires binary representation. Figure 3 shows the
throughput versus the number of messages and the opti-
mal n value for each of the four packet sizes. As we can
see from this ﬁgure, the number of messages in the MT
(i.e., the number of S2 packets) has signiﬁcant eﬀect on
























Figure 5 Throughput comparison of diﬀerent policies under diﬀerent SNRs.
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Figure 6 Eﬀects of the channel state transition matrix on throughput.
the system throughput. As indicated in Section 3.3, the
throughput starts to increase initially with the increase of
the number of messages in the MT, but then decreases
on account of large signature size overheads and the pay-
load subsequently drops to zero. Therefore, the number of
messages that provides the highest throughput, for a given
packet size, is chosen as the optimal n value. The optimal
number of messages in the MT for packet sizes 128, 256,
512, and 1024 bytes are 4, 8, 16, and 32, respectively.
Next, we start to illustrate the performance improve-
ments of our POMDP policy. We compare the POMDP
policy with three other policies. For the ﬁrst policy, we
assume the channel state can be observed accurately.
Therefore, the POMDP policy becomes an MDP policy.
The second policy is the existing policy, in which the vehi-
cle nodes use the observed inaccurate channel states in
the current epoch to make the relay selection decision
for the subsequent epoch. The third policy is the random





















Figure 7 Eﬀects of the channel observation error on throughput.
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policy, in which the vehicle nodes randomly choose relays.
Figures 4 and 5 show the throughput performance for the
four policies given diﬀerent packet sizes and transmis-
sion SNRs. As shown in the ﬁgures, the proposed POMDP
policy signiﬁcantly improves the average throughput com-
pared to the existing policy. This is because the existing
policy makes relay selection decisions by its current chan-
nel information, and it does not consider the dynamic
transition of the wireless channel in VANETs, which is
very important information to make relay selection deci-
sions. The simulation results also show that our POMDP
policy performance is very close to the MDP policy. The
channel estimation error cannot be avoided in VANETs,
but our POMDP policy can minimize the impact caused
by channel estimation error, and achieve a satisfying per-
formance.
5.2 Eﬀects of the state transition matrix
We evaluate how the parameters in the channel state tran-
sition matrix aﬀect the average reward. Given the channel
state transition matrix Pt , Figure 6 shows the simulation
results for the eﬀect of the transition probability of staying
in the same state.
We can observe from this ﬁgure that the POMDP pol-
icy achieves a much greater performance improvement
in comparison to the existing and random policies when
the transition probability of staying in the same state is
very small. The average throughput in the existing pol-
icy gradually approaches to the POMDP case with the
increase of that probability. This is because when the tran-
sition probability of staying in the same state increases,
the channel becomes more memoryless, and the advan-
tage of POMDP policy is not obvious given a memoryless
channel.
5.3 Eﬀects of the observation model parameters
The observation matrix in (30) is derived from the chan-
nel estimation error δ. We evaluate how the channel
estimation error aﬀects the average throughput.
Figure 7 shows the average throughput under diﬀerent
channel estimation errors δ for the diﬀerent policies. All
three policies’ performance decreases signiﬁcantly with
the increase of channel estimation error. This is because
an accurate channel state is diﬃcult to obtain when
the channel estimation error increases. A higher chan-
nel estimation error increases the probability of observing
a wrong channel state and the probability of making a
wrong decision. Nevertheless, from these two ﬁgures, we
observe that the performance of the proposed POMDP
policy does not decrease asmuch as the other two policies.
This is because the POMDP policy considers the channel
errors in the formulation, and it decreases the observation
errors’ impacts on the throughput performance.
6 Conclusions and future work
The distinct characteristics of VANETs, such as high
node mobility and relatively low elevation of the anten-
nas on vehicles, make the QoS provisioning challenging.
In this article, we proposed to use recent advances in
cooperative communications to enhance the QoS per-
formance of VANETs. In order to address the security
problem caused by cooperative communications, we pre-
sented a joint design of security and QoS provisioning in
VANETs. We proposed a prevention-based technique for
secure relay selection taking into consideration authenti-
cation protocol, which is based on hash chains and MT,
to provide both end-to-end and hop-by-hop authentica-
tion and integrity protection. Particularly, we considered
channel estimation errors and the impacts of security on
throughput QoS performance in VANETs. The dynamic
wireless channel was modeled as a ﬁnite-sate Markov pro-
cess. With channel estimation errors, the channel state
cannot accurately be observed. Therefore, we formulated
the relay selection and the number of messages/data
blocks selection problem as a POMDP. The optimal pol-
icy was obtained by a separated principle. Simulation
results show that the number of messages/data blocks in
the MT has signiﬁcant impacts on the throughput QoS.
The proposed scheme signiﬁcantly improves the eﬀec-
tive secure throughput. In addition, due to considering
the channel errors in the formulation, the POMDP policy
decreases the observation errors’ impacts on the through-
put performance.
Future work is in progress to consider network topology
control in VANETs using the proposed combined security
and QoS provisioning framework.
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